



The Road from a Depoliticized to a Centrifugal Democracy

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To explain the impact of the 'new politics' of Fortuyn and his party LPF on Dutch politics, we have analysed the election programmes 1998 and 2002. The positions of parties are measured by the confrontational approach. Dutch politics in 1998 was a *depoliticized democracy*, which we have modelled by a three-dimensional ideological triangle. This triangle is based on the division between the three main ideologies of the three-party families, the socialists, the liberals and the Christians. Fortuyn dominated the political agenda of the election of 2002 with his criticism on the purple coalition. His 'new politics' was focused on economic and multicultural issues. We have used these issues for the construction of a two-dimensional space of competition 2002. The model of 2002 helps to explain the ideological positions of the parties and the advent of a *centrifugal democracy*.



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Introduction

In a study in 1998 the question was posed what the new cleavages of Dutch politics would be in the near future. One of the authors, Van Thijn, described a political situation in which the CDA committed itself to a 'rainbow scenario' in its 1998 manifesto. In this scenario each segment could be part of the Dutch society while keeping its own culture. The GreenLeft also accepted the multicultural society without hesitation. Van Thijn noticed that the PvdA was 'ducking' the problem of the multicultural society, because it did not mention this in its election programme. According to Van Thijn the VVD was reluctant to make the politics of multicultural society and immigration a key issue in 1998, because this would jeopardize the continuation of the purple coalition (Van Thijn, 1998). In the same study, Pellikaan and De Keijser predicted that the politics of the multicultural society would become the new cleavage in Dutch politics (Pellikaan and De Keijser, 1998).

A few years later, Thomassen predicted the possibility of the rise of a populist right because the parties had moved towards the centre. The VVD had moved away from the rightist position of the political spectrum and this would



Q7 create an opportunity for a populist right-wing party (Thomassen, 2002, 208–209). Andeweg also predicted that the consensus democracy in Netherlands could lead to a strong populist right, as was the case in Belgium, France and Austria (Andeweg, 2001).

With the ‘new politics’ of Fortuyn and the LPF, the politics of multiculturalism and immigration has become the new cleavage in 2002. So far, all these predictions came true. However, the question is whether the new politics of the LPF must be interpreted in terms of the left–right orientation.

This article is concerned with the impact of the so-called ‘new politics’ of Pim Fortuyn on the ideological positioning of the Dutch political parties in the elections of 2002 and 2003. To understand this impact, we have to describe the political landscape before it was influenced by the rise of Fortuyn and thereby ‘compare’ the election of 2002 with the election of 1998. In this article, we will deal with the question of how the Dutch political parties have realigned themselves ideologically in the recent parliamentary elections. We will answer this question by presenting separate spaces of competition for 1998 and 2002. The position of political parties in the spatial models is measured by analysing the election programmes.

Spatial Models of the Position of Political Actors

In the research on the position of political parties, the parties’ ideological stances and preferences are typically described in spatial terms: parties are said to have ideological ‘positions’. These ideological positions are often described in bipolar terms (the terms ‘left’ and ‘right’ are usually used for these poles). The left–right distinction originates from the French Constituent Assembly of 1789, where the progressives were seated to the left of the Chair, and the conservatives to the right. Since then the ideological position of the extremes has been labelled as ‘left’ or ‘right’, the actors in the middle have been labelled as ‘centre’ (Laver and Hunt, 1992, 11).

The configuration of left and right in the post-revolutionary French Assembly has become the archetype for spatial theories, such as Downs’ left–right orientation. Downs assumes that ideologies are helpful for the voters as a ‘short cut’ that saves the voter the costs of being informed on a wider range of issues. He also assumes that parties use ideologies as a means in the struggle for office (Downs, 1957, 96–98). This struggle is modelled by Downs along the left–right straight-line scale, which represents the political orientation of voters and parties. Most electoral studies are based upon Downs’ notion that voters have no complete knowledge of the effect of the policy of each party on their expected personal gain or loss. In this situation of uncertainty ‘a voter finds party ideologies useful because they remove the necessity of his relating every issue to his own philosophy. Ideologies help him focus attention on the




Figure 1 The position of Dutch parties on the dominant conflict dimension.

differences between parties' (Downs, 1957, 98). In the classical theory of Downs, the left extreme is a situation where the economy is completely in the hands of the government, that is, full government control. The right extreme represents the libertarian ideal of a completely free market (Downs, 1957, 116).

Electoral studies have transformed the original Downsian left–right scale into a dominant conflict dimension that covers all political issues. The position of voters and the perception of the position of parties on the dominant conflict dimension are measured by asking people to place themselves and the parties on a left–right scale. Empirical research on the left–right orientation of voters and parties during several elections has resulted in a very stable ranking of Dutch party families: socialist parties on the left side of the scale, the Christian parties in the centre and on the right, and the liberal and conservative parties on the right side (De Swaan, 1973; Van der Eijk and Niemöller, 1983; Anker, 1992; Van der Brug, 1997). Figure 1 illustrates the position of the Dutch party families on the left–right scale.

Downs' left–right orientation is basically designed for a party system without the presence of Christian parties (Koch, 1979). The competition among parties is supposed to be a competition between left and right. Some ethical issues cannot easily be seen in this single dimension. In many countries, the position of 'pro life' in ethical issues coincides with a 'pro market' position in economic affairs, but in Dutch politics this link between ethical issues and economic issues is not self-evident. For example, the VVD is regarded as a rightist party in economic affairs, but this party is not in favour of moral laws that forbid an individual to make a choice in ethical questions like abortion and euthanasia. This means that the VVD has a 'leftist' position towards ethical issues and a 'rightist' position in economic issues.

To solve the problem that a 'pro life' attitude of Dutch parties is not always in agreement with a 'pro market' position, the Anglo-American model has been adapted to make it more suitable for the Dutch politics. The single dimension is replaced by a two-dimensional model. Figure 2 shows a model where the political competition among parties takes place on a battlefield that is defined by two separate dimensions, the economic dimension and the ethical dimension (Irwin and Van Holsteyn, 1989; Irwin and Van Holsteyn, 1999) In this so-




Figure 2 Two-dimensional ideological 'heartlands and battlefield' model.

called 'heartlands and battlefield' model, the parties have a natural place, or heartland, which is determined by their ideological beliefs. The heartland of the socialist parties is the upper left corner in the spatial model, which indicates that the socialists are in favour of state intervention and a neutral government. In the upper right corner in Figure 2, the liberal parties share the notion of a neutral government with the socialists, but they are against state intervention. On the bottom of the figure are the Christian parties, who have a mixed position on economic affairs, but they share a common belief with regard to ethical questions.

The design of the heartlands model is based on the Downsian spatial theory, but it has been adapted to make it more suitable for analysing the specific context of Dutch politics. This adaptation reveals the basic methodological question: what is the purpose of the model? Is the purpose of the model to give an accurate description of the ideological positions of parties and voters? Or is the purpose of the model to give an explanation of electoral behaviour?

If the purpose of the model is to give an explanation of electoral behaviour, the test of the one-dimensional left–right scale *vs* the two-dimensional 'heartland' model is solely defined in terms of their predictive capability, that



is, how much of the electoral behaviour can be explained in statistical terms by each of the two models. If the single dimension works better than the ‘heartlands and battlefield’ model, electoral studies will use the dominant conflict dimension as their main tool, and *vice versa*. This was also the view of Downs who subscribed to the positivistic methodology of Milton Friedman: ‘Theoretical models should be tested primarily by the accuracy of their predictions rather than by the reality of their assumption’ (Downs, 1957, 21).

However, if one uses the accuracy of the prediction as the only criterion for a model, there is a potential danger that the model will give a good prediction without giving sufficient information to interpret (a fundamental shift in) a political situation. In this article, we want to analyse the impact of the ‘new politics’ of Fortuyn and his party, the LPF. In order to understand the ideology behind the ‘new politics’, we have adapted the dimensions of the spatial model that describes the parliamentary election of 2002. To understand the dramatic change in Dutch politics in 2002, we must also show the spatial model of 1998.

Measuring the Position of Political Actors

Positioning political actors in a spatial model is a way of describing the ideological preferences of political parties. Choosing to include certain policy dimensions in a model and leaving others out, enables one to look at preference structures in different ways. Therefore, there is no one best model, nor is there an *a priori* reason to adopt a certain dimension. Different choices simply lead to different outcomes and enable us to describe party systems from different perspectives.

Choosing a set of dimensions is the first of many choices when constructing a graphical representation of policy space. What follows is the question how to place political parties on these dimensions. There are several ways to measure the policy position of political parties. Mair has offered an overview of the approaches ‘to locate the positions of political parties in policy and/or ideological spaces’ (Mair, 2001, 11). There are some pros and cons for each method, that is, the use of mass survey, elite studies, expert surveys and the analysis of elections programmes. In this study, we present a specific method to measure the policy position of parties in the election programmes that will be elaborated later.¹

We have chosen for the analysis of manifestos in terms of the pro and con positions on a number of political issues. According to Laver, ‘For most people, an actor’s ‘policies’ have to do with ‘positions’ taken on on particular issues. Is he, for example, for or against capital punishment? Does she support or oppose the legalisation of soft drugs? Or of voluntary euthanasia?’ (Laver, 2001, 66). The use of pro and con positions on political issues, instead of using



the traditional coding scheme of the Manifesto Research Group (MRG) has the advantage that we are able to measure also the position of the small parties and not only the parties that are considered to play a role in the formation of a coalition. There is another reason for using the confrontational approach, instead of the 'valency' approach of the MRG procedures (Budge, 2001; Budge *et al.*, 2001). The MRG approach is based on the assumption that 'valence issues can be used to locate parties and trace their movements in space once we recognize that parties differentiate themselves on them 'not by directly opposing positions but by varying emphases on a shared position' (Budge, 2001, 60). However, during the election of 2002, the Dutch parties were forced to take up a range of explicit positions on issues of the politics of multiculturalism and the economics of the neo-liberal purple coalition.

The advantage of the confrontational approach is that one can use the same issues for measuring the position of parties (by coding the election programmes), the positions of voters, the perception of the position of parties by the voters (by presenting the same issues in a large scale survey design) and the perception of parties by members of the Dutch parliament (by presenting the same issues to the members of the Dutch parliament). This means that the position of the parties voters' perception of the position of the parties, and the position of the voters and politicians can all be measured by the same yardstick. If the positions of political actors are measured by the same issues, it will be possible to integrate the research on policy positions of political actors based on content analysis, with electoral studies and the research on the parliament that uses data from surveys.² By integrating the research on political actors, it will also be possible to combine the purpose of the model of giving a realistic description of the ideological positions of parties and voters, with the goal of giving an accurate prediction of electoral behaviour. In this study we can only present the part that measures the position of political parties by analysing the election programmes.³

In the next section, we will present the spatial model of 1998. As stated above, to understand the impact of 'new politics', that is, Fortuyn and the LPF, in the parliamentary election of 2002, we first must look at the political context of 'old politics' in the Netherlands.

Before we present the three-dimensional model of 1998, we have to explain some aspects of the concept of the *space of competition*. The spatial presentation of the position of political parties is not based on their ideology alone, but also on the political polarization between or among parties. If the relationship between political parties is antagonistic, the opposition in a multiparty system is explained in terms of political polarization. Sartori argued that in spite of the criticism, the overall view was that a spatial left-right scheme of party positioning was still a realistic representation in a polarized multiparty system (Sartori, 1966, 153). In other words, the concept of the space



of competition is first of all defined by the question whether or not the position of parties is explained in terms of political polarization. If there exists a strong antagonistic or divergent position on some specific issue, the relevant model of the *space of competition* is one-dimensional. The left–right locations of parties is then the best way to measure polarization (Sani and Sartori 1983). The one dimensional model does not deny that parties differentiate themselves on the issues that belong to their ideological heartlands. Sanni and Sartori argue that the left–right scale encompasses the separate conflict issues between parties — in a polarized democracy the space of competition is the left–right orientation — ‘regardless of how many cleavage and/or identification dimensions exists’ (Sani and Sartori, 1983, 330).

The logical consequence is that in a situation without strong antagonistic or divergent positions on some specific issue, the relevant model of the space of competition is no longer one dimensional. During the 1960s and 1970s, the period in which the political struggle was antagonistic and highly polarized, the left–right orientation was probably the appropriate space of competition. However, at the end of the 20th century there is no polarization and the parties have established a consensus democracy (Lijphart, 2001, 2002; Koole and Daalder, 2002). In a discussion between Lijphart and Andeweg about the ‘pros and cons of consensus democracy’, Andeweg warned of the danger of the lack of competition in the Dutch consensus democracy, because a depoliticized democracy can lead to the support of a strong populist right (Andeweg, 2001, 124–125). Lijphart on the other hand, sees the lack of competition as a selling point for a consensus democracy (Lijphart 2001). Although they have a different view on the pros and cons, both saw — as did Koole and Daalder — Dutch politics before 2002 as a depoliticized consensus democracy. This means that the *space of competition* for 1998 is not necessarily one dimensional. We can thus include more dimensions to analyse the existence of the ideological differences.

The construction of any space of competition that estimates the position of political actors must be defined in terms of the political specifics of a certain election. For example, if during the campaign of the next election we are confronted with a major catastrophe, such as the Chernobyl nuclear power plant disaster or a substantial rise of the sea level through global warming, the environmental issues will become a dimension in the space of competition. And if the European Union (EU) would threaten to fall apart due to a lack of political consensus among the member states, the political issues concerning the EU will be part of the model. In the campaign of 2002 there was no ecological disaster, but the impact of the ‘new politics’ of Fortuyn was very considerable all the same. To understand the positions of political parties in a specific political context, one has to develop a *space of competition* that takes the key issues into account.



The consequences of our approach in the construction of a space of competition are considerable. If the space of competition is defined by the political and cultural context of a specific country in a specific time, there is no comparative analysis possible — across time nor across nations — in terms of the change of specific parties. Statements like ‘the Dutch labour party, the PvdA, has moved more to the left and away from the labour party of Tony Blair’, become meaningless. Also, the statement that ‘the position of the PvdA in 2002 is more rightist than its position in 1998’, become problematic. Any statement of this kind presupposes the existence of an absolute and common space of competition for all time and all places. However, in political science we do not have no such yardstick to measure a common space. The yardstick of the left–right orientation is no longer identical in each country and across time. In other words, there is no such thing as an absolute and common space of competition. Any comparison across time and nation must be done with the utmost precaution and must be based on the acknowledgement that political science simply does not have the necessary instruments to solve the philosophical problem concerning space and time (Reichenbach, 1958).⁴

We think that it is not possible to work with a framework of absolute and *common space* of competition, but it is possible to design a *local space*, where the position of political actors can be measured. By using the same issues for measuring the position of parties, voters and members of parliament (and their perception of the position of parties), it will be possible to integrate electoral studies, parliamentary studies and the study of the position of parties into one research design for a specific election. A local space can combine the requirement of an accurate prediction with realistic assumptions. Furthermore, it is still possible to make some comparison across time and across nations, but these statements must be made on a higher level of abstraction: The comparative analysis is not on the individual level of the position of a party, but on party families (Mair and Mudde, 1998), party systems (Daalder and Mair, 1983; Mair, 1997) or democracies (Lijphart, 1999).⁵

1998: Communitarianism as the Third Dimension

During the 8 years that the purple coalition was in power, the socialists and the liberals were in agreement about the policy on ethical issues. Marriage between homosexuals and the adoption of children by homosexuals were legalized by the purple coalition. The important issue of euthanasia was settled by this government as well.⁶ With this purple policy on ethical issues, the Christian democratic party (CDA) was forced to make a political and ideological decision. The CDA realized that reversing the ethical policy of the purple coalition was not an option, because this position would make their membership of a future coalition very difficult. The solution was to redefine



Q9 the ideological basis of its own ‘heartlands’. The Christian democratic answer was an ideological shift away from the Christian ‘pro life’ issues towards a new basis, which was found in the communitarian values (Klop, 1998; Balkende, 2001). Communitarianism is founded on the notion of a community, such as family, voluntary associations, the church, housing corporations and other classical corporatist organizations.

The CDA subscribed to a viewpoint of Etzioni who wrote *The New Golden Rule. Community and Morality in a Democratic Society* (1996). In this book, Etzioni presents the moral community as the cement of society that prevents the risk of social breakdown due to the atomistic liberal individual with his hedonistic and materialistic wants and needs. With this ideological reorientation, the placing of political actors in a spatial model, which is based on their ideological preferences, becomes more complicated. The modelling of the *space of competition* of 1998 is three dimensional. The communitarian dimension is added to the economic and the ethical dimensions.

With these three dimensions we can make a space of competition to model the three main ideologies that dominated the Dutch political scene since the emergence of political parties in the late 19th century (Van Doorn, 1998). Socialism, confessionalism and liberalism have been the most prominent forces in the national parliament as well as on other political levels, the so-called pillars of the ‘*verzuiling*’. Each of the ideological pillars represented only a minority of the Dutch population, and each of these pillars was based on the social, economic and religious cleavages in the Netherlands (Lijphart, 1968).

The oppositions between the three main ideologies were relative in importance since the parties representing them were forced to cooperate to form majority governments. In other words, the parties were dependent on each other to transform their principles into policy by means of compromises. These oppositions and similarities between the three ideologies was seen as an ‘ideological triangle’ (De Beus *et al.*, 1989). Lijphart’s politics of accommodation and the theory of consociational democracy are consonant with the concept of the ideological triangle. De Beus *et al.* not only claimed that socialism, confessionalism and liberalism dominated the political arena since the late 19th century, but also stated that parties that emerged during the 20th century can be placed in one of the three main ideologies. They therefore denounce the existence of new ideologies in the Netherlands after the Second World War, notably that of a post-materialist ideology that is sometimes attributed to parties like D66 and GreenLeft.

The notion of an ideological triangle is not new. Pappi has suggested a model based on an ideological triangle for explaining the German party system. According to Pappi ‘one should give up the simple framework of a left–right dimension underlying the German party system. I suggest instead the model of an isosceles triangle, where the point represent the three parties...’ (Pappi,




Figure 3 The ideological triangle model.

1984, 12). The three parties in Pappi's triangle are also the socialists, the liberals and the Christian parties.

To operationalize the ideological triangle, one has to construct a multi-dimensional space that reflects the diversity in both ideological dimensions and political parties. In the case of the Dutch political parties, it seems relevant to select these on the basis of the historical importance of the three main ideologies of socialism, confessionism and liberalism. The concept of the ideological triangle is used to describe the location of the Dutch parties in 1998. The three lines or dimensions in Figure 3 are the basis of the ideological triangle that represents the relationship between these party families. Each line or dimension defines the core elements of one of the three-party families. For example, the defining feature of socialist ideology is a commitment to equality, 'equality being the political value that most clearly distinguishes socialism from its rivals' (Heywood, 1998, 109). The political goal of equality can be realized by the intervention of the government in the economy. We have placed the economic dimension on the x -axis.



Liberty is the defining feature of the liberals, that is, individual freedom is the ideological bench-mark of liberalism (Gray, 1989). Liberalism opposes the organic and corporatist idea that puts society in the centre of its ideology as is embedded in both confessionalism (the community, the family, the church, etc.) and socialism (trade unions). This division resulted in the selection of the communitarian dimension that is formed by the role of the community on the one hand and the role of the individual on the other hand. The communitarian dimension is placed on the y -axis.

The basis of the Christian parties rests in their religious principles that are based upon the Bible (Van Putten, 1985). Ethical norms are the foundation of a Christian society and the moral laws are an important instrument for the protection of Christian society. The confessional ideology stresses the importance of a government that uses legislation of moral issues. In the confessional ideology, the government should be responsible for ethical legislation that guides the moral choices that citizens have to make in their lives. Liberalism and socialism are opposed to this notion because they believe in the freedom of choice of the individual. This division led to the creation of the ethical dimension. This dimension is constructed by placing the values of a moral state on one end of the dimension and the neutral state on the other end. The ethical dimension is placed on the z -axis. Figure 3 shows the model of the *ideological triangle*.

After the selection of the dimensions, the party positions on these dimensions should be measured. For each dimension, 10 political issues were chosen that were thought to be relevant and representative for that dimension. Issues were politically relevant when the text of the party manifestos that were used to score the position of the political parties indicated that they were important to the parties.⁷ Issues had to be representative for some sort of conflict or disagreement between parties, because a large consensus on a political issue does not differentiate between the political parties. Issues that were mentioned by only one or a few parties were considered not to be useful. Not only did the issues have to be politically relevant, all issues were subjected to statistical tests. These show that we can construct a three-dimensional model (Elkink and De Lange, 2002; Pellikaan, 2002).⁸

All parties were assigned scores on a number of issues. There were three possible scores: plus one, zero and minus one. On the economic dimension, parties that made positive statements on the 10 issues that measured the degree of support for a free market economy received positive scores. Parties that made negative statements on issues concerning a free market economy received negative scores. On the communitarian dimension, positive scores were assigned to those statements that indicated support for issues concerning the importance of investment in the role of the community in society. Negative scores were given to statements that denied the role of the community and




Figure 4 The ideological triangle model as a three-dimensional model.

stressed the role of the individual on the issues that were selected. Finally, positive scores were attributed to those statements indicating support for issues concerning moral legislation on the ethical dimension. Negative scores were given to statements that proclaimed that the government should refrain from moral legislation and take a neutral position on ethical issues. All parties that did not make any statements on certain issues or made ambiguous statements were assigned the score zero. The 'null score' on a specific issue implies that a party has no position to change the status quo.

To represent the party positions on the three dimensions, various statistical possibilities were available. The choice was made to use the absolute scores of the parties on the dimensions in a simple three-dimensional model placing the three axes in a cube (the economic dimension on the *x*-axis, the communitarian dimension on the *y*-axis and the ethical dimension on the *z*-axis). The origin of the three axes thus represents the centre of the political space reflecting a neutral party position on all three axes⁹ (see Figure 4).

When the political parties are placed in the three-dimensional model the three main ideologies in the Netherlands can be clearly distinguished. The socialist parties (PvdA, GreenLeft and the SP) position themselves as being in favour of economic state intervention; they underline the role of the community in society and plead for a morally neutral state. The two smaller parties (GL and the SP) take a more radical position on all three dimensions than the PvdA. The confessional parties (CDA, SGP, GPV and RPF) support a free market economy, stress the role of the community in society and are also in favour that the government imposes moral legislation. Here, the CDA takes



a more moderate stand on the ethical dimension than the orthodox protestant parties SGP, GPV and RPF.

The liberal parties (VVD and D66) also support a free market economy, but favour the individual over the community and want a morally neutral state. However, the position of the two parties is not identical. D66 takes a more radical position on the ethical dimensions, while the VVD is more outspoken on both the economic and the communitarian dimensions. The three-dimensional figure demonstrates that all political parties that were represented in the parliament between 1998 and 2002 can be placed in the three main ideologies. There are no parties that position themselves on a different combination of poles of the dimensions. This observation supports the claim of De Beus *et al.* that the political parties that emerged since the late 1960s have positioned themselves within the main ideologies and are not representatives of a new ideology in the Netherlands.

2002: Redefining Communitarianism

Two political aspects dominated the campaign of the election of 2002, namely the economic issues and the politics of multiculturalism (see Van Praag, in this issue). This political agenda was set by Fortuyn, and his new party, the LPF. The parties of the purple coalition were not prepared for the new politics. The election programmes of the labour party (PvdA), the democrats (D66) and the liberal party (VVD) reveal that the coalition parties were very pleased with themselves because of the macroeconomic results. The purple coalition had established a situation of full employment and also created a financial surplus. Besides these economic effects, the coalition had settled some ethical issues, such as legalizing euthanasia and the opening of marriage between homosexuals, which would not have been possible if the Christian democrats had still been in office. In the 2002 campaign, the ethical issues were only relevant for the two orthodox protestant parties (CU and SGP) that were against the legalizing of euthanasia and the marriage between homosexuals.¹⁰ The CDA did not want to reverse the ethical politics of the neo-liberal purple government. This meant that the ethical issues were not salient during the campaign. Also most communitarian issues, described in the last section, were no longer seen as important political issues because they were overshadowed by the politics of multiculturalism and the problems with immigrants. Besides the multiculturalism and immigrants, the political debate was about economic issues, such as the problems with the privatization of public services. Consequently, the relevant dimensions in the election of 2002 are the economic dimension and the multicultural dimension.

Before we introduce the new model of 2002, we have to explain some aspects that can shed some light on the question as to why the politics of



multiculturalism could dominate the political arena. An important element is that coalition parties were not aware of the growing dissatisfaction of the public with the politics of the purple coalition. The coalition parties were convinced that the neo-liberal politics would be the dominant politics in the near future and the only question seemed to be which party, the PvdA or the VVD, would become the largest and would therefore deliver the prime minister. The VVD party was hoping to become the largest political party in the 21st century, after a century of dominance by the Christian parties and the socialists.

The parties of the purple coalition realized too late that the public was annoyed by the quality and the price of privatized public services. The performance of the privatized services was in deep contrast with the promised outcome of the introduction of the market mechanism. The argument of the neo-liberal purple government for the privatization of public services was that the market would guarantee a high quality with a low price. Not only was the quality of the services poor, but the prices were also considerably higher than before. The aggravation of the public, in which all this resulted, affected the core of the neo-liberal government. At first, the coalition parties ignored the growing dissatisfaction with the quality of the services of the privatized companies, such as the railway (NS) and the providers of cable television (UPC). However, the political situation changed dramatically with the new political phenomenon Pim Fortuyn and his book 'The mess of 8 years purple government', which is a radical manifesto against the neo-liberal economic policy. Fortuyn changed the political arena, and his party, the LPF, was the catalyst of dissatisfaction of the citizens. He was able to focus the political debate on the neo-liberal economic policy, the multicultural society and the problems related with new immigrants.

Before the 9/11 attack in New York, any reference towards a policy of restricting immigrants was directly associated with the ideological position of the extreme-right. One of the effects of the terrorist attack in 2001 on the Twin Towers was that the issue of immigrants — especially the immigrants from Islamic nations — was no longer a political taboo. However, even before the 9/11 attack there were voices warning against the danger coming from the Islamic culture. For example, Samuel Huntington argued in 1996 that the clash of civilizations was the greatest threat to world peace and according to Huntington the Western universal ideals were at stake. His advice was that Western countries must preserve their culture against the growing influence of Islamic culture (Huntington, 1996).

After 9/11, the failures of the politics of multiculturalism were no longer seen as academic questions, but as serious political problems that needed a solution. However, the mainstream political parties did not dare to provide an answer to these questions. Fortuyn recognized the political moment and he gave the



political answers that people were asking for. He dictated the new political agenda and got much media attention with it. Although Fortuyn was characterized by some persons in the media and by other political parties as a representative of the extreme-right, his statements about restricting the arrival of immigrants were already *'salonfähig'* or fashionable. And, the other political parties followed the political agenda of Fortuyn by also introducing all sorts of restrictions for the arrival of immigrants. This combination of criticizing Fortuyn, on the one hand and copying his proposals on the other hand, made the LPF the genuine article and the other parties the imitators.

To understand the ideological position of Fortuyn, it is necessary to look at his book *De Islamisering van onze cultuur* (The Islamization of our Culture). In this book, Fortuyn endorsed Huntington's view of the 'clash of civilizations' between the Western democracies and the Islamic world. The focal point of Fortuyn was not the threat of the Islamic culture to world peace, but the threat of the Islamic culture to his notion of a 'Dutch Identity'. According to Fortuyn, the foundation of the Dutch identity is the Christian–Judaic–Humanist culture (Fortuyn, 2001, 106). This threat towards to the Dutch identity could be prevented by blocking the arrival of new immigrants from Islamic nations and by forcing the old immigrants to accept the dominant values of the Christian–Judaic–Humanist culture. Furthermore, Fortuyn argued that any attempt to include the values of the Islamic community within the Christian–Judaic–Humanist culture was bound to fail. Political parties that subscribed the politics of multiculturalism failed to see, according to Fortuyn, that they were trying to mix oil with water.

Against the politics of multiculturalism Fortuyn presented the Dutch identity, that is, the politics of uniculturalism. To realize this political goal, the reduction in the number of new immigrants and the geographic spacing of old immigrants were the highest priorities. After closing the borders, the politics of uniculturalism is focused on the old immigrants who must assimilate to the dominant Western culture. Both policies must transform the multicultural society into a unicultural society that is founded on the principles of the Enlightenment and that accepts the dominant values of the Christian–Judaic–Humanist culture. Behind the politics of uniculturalism lies the belief in the intellectual and cultural progress of the Western society since the *Enlightenment*. It is based upon the notion of human rights, natural liberty and the separation of secular power and religion. Furthermore, Fortuyn is an adherent of the philosophy of moral universalism, which means that he claims that there is an absolute, and universal, basis from which to judge any custom, institution and belief. In his view the Islamic culture is backwards, in terms of their vision on issues like homosexuality. Not only did his view get a lot of media attention and were Fortuyn and the LPF able to dominate the political debate, but Fortuyn did something else. He took the next step in the ideological



development of communitarianism. Fortuyn changed the micro-orientation on family values, corporations and associations into a macro-version of communitarianism. Etzioni's abstract notion of community and morality in a democratic society was translated by Fortuyn in specific policies against the arrival of immigrants from non-Western states, and the policy of the government to impose morality on the Dutch community. A morality based on the dominant Western values of the Christian–Judaic–Humanist culture.

The Unicultural–multicultural Dimension

Q3

We have constructed a new dimension in order to establish the position of political parties in terms of the antithesis uniculturalism *vs* multiculturalism. To make this antithesis operational, we measured the dimension by 10 items (see Appendix A) The *first* aspect of the politics of uniculturalism is the limitation of the number of immigrants. The aspect has five components or items: restrict the inflow of asylum seekers (item 1); restrict the number of residence permits for asylum seekers (item 2); restrict the (re)unification of members of a family of immigrants with a residence permit (item 3); reject the EU agreements on immigrants by accepting the principle of subsidiarity (item 4); and finally, the spacing of allochtonous people over schools and neighbourhoods (item 5).

The *second* aspect of the politics of uniculturalism, namely the socialization of the old immigrants, also has five aspects: reinforce the Western values and the Dutch language (items 6 and 7); strengthen the Dutch identity (item 8); stop the teaching in the languages of the immigrants (item 9); and end the subsidization of allochtonous associations (item 10).

We have analysed the election programmes on these 10 items. Each party can get a minus score (supporting the multicultural society), a plus score (supporting the unicultural society), or a zero score (the election programme has no clear position on the specific item). This leads to a scale or dimension with 21 points: the extreme minus 10 is the position of a party that embraces the multicultural and open society, and the other extreme plus 10 is the position of a party that is in favour of a unicultural and closed society.

Table 1 shows the scores of the parties on the multicultural dimension. The party of the so-called 'new politics', the LPF, is in favour of restricting the arrival of new immigrants and proclaimed that the government must play a role in promoting the dominant values of the Christian–Judaic–Humanist culture. Fortuyn's party gets the highest score (also the maximum score) on the multiculturalist–uniculturalist dimension.

The two small Christian parties (CU and SGP) subscribe to the idea that the government must take an active role in spreading the Christian values among Dutch citizens. They are less inclined to take harsh measures to restrict the



Table 1 Scores on the multicultural items

	<i>First five items New immigrants</i>	<i>Second five items Old immigrants</i>	<i>Total score</i>
Christian parties			
CDA	3	1	+4
SGP	2	4	+6
CU	1	3	+4
Socialist parties			
PvdA	2	2	+4
SP	1	0	+1
GreenLeft	-4	-1	-5
Liberal parties			
D66	0	-2	-2
VVD	4	4	+8
VVD (draft)	1	0	+1
'New politics' LPF	5	5	+10

arrival of new immigrants. The CDA, on the other hand, is more in favour of restricting immigration and is less prone to impose the Christian culture on all Dutch citizens. The reason behind this difference within the Christian party family is that the small religious parties are against a multireligious society, and the CDA is in favour of a consociational democracy where the Moslems form their own voluntary associations. Their solution to the problem of the multicultural society is to back to organizing religious groups along the lines of segmented cleavages (Lijphart, 1977, 4).

The socialist parties have no common position either on the politics of multiculturalism. The labour party (PvdA) has an ambivalent position: it is not against a consociational democracy with a new Moslem pillar, but it also wants to include the old immigrants into a modern Western society. And, the PvdA is in favour of some measures to reduce the number of immigrants. The SP is against the restriction of immigrants, but it accepts the policy of spacing the allochtonous people among schools and neighbourhoods to avoid ghettos. Among the three socialists parties, only the GreenLeft embraces the multicultural society. Besides GL, there is one other party that defends the politics of multiculturalism, and that is the social-liberal party, D66. The other liberal party, the VVD, is very outspoken in its view against the arrival of new immigrants and it is also in favour of a uniculturalist politic by the government. This position of the VVD is, in many respects remarkable. Before Fortuyn had changed the political arena, the VVD had made the draft of it election programme, in which it defends the classical liberal values in terms of personal freedom and individual responsibility. This draft manifesto



has all the characteristics of a liberal party: ‘The politics of integration of the government should be based on the uniqueness of every individual and not on the notion of a group where the individual belongs to...’¹¹

During the party congress (25 and 26 January, 2002) in Arnhem, the VVD changed their view on the politics of immigration and the role of the government in pursuing the notion of a Dutch identity. The conservative grass roots of the VVD demanded a more restrictive policy towards immigrants and they also wanted to emphasize the Dutch values. During this congress, the VVD changed its ideology from liberalism to some form of moral utilitarianism, that is, the VVD was no longer impartial between different conceptions of ‘the good’. Liberalism is based on moral neutrality of the definition of the good society (Rawls, 1999, 354–355). The outcome is that there is little difference between moral utilitarianism of the VVD and the conservative ideology of the LPF. This means that even before Fortuyn had launched his new party, the VVD had already adopted his views on the multicultural society. However, during the campaign of 2002, Hans Dijkstal, the leader of the VVD, refused to propagate the new conservative political message in simple sound bites. To avoid this discrepancy between the manifesto views and the political messages, Dijkstal was replaced by Gerrit Zalm, who was willing to lead a more conservative campaign in the election of 2003.

The Economic Dimension

We have constructed the economic dimension in accordance with the economic theory of Anthony Downs. On the left extreme of the dimension stands ‘state intervention’ and on the right extreme ‘free market’. In the classical theory of Downs, the left extreme is a situation where the economy is completely in the hands of the government, that is, full government control, and the right extreme represents a Nozick-like minimal state with a free market. For Dutch society, both these extremes are not realistic. All economic issues are within the domain of the ‘small margins’ of Dutch politics.¹² If a party has the maximum score of minus 10, it means that it is in favour of a stronger role of the government in the economic sphere, but this position is nowhere near full government control of the economy. The same is true for the other extreme. If a party has a maximum score of plus 10, this party must not be seen as a libertarian party. The maximum score ‘pro market’ must be interpreted as a clear indication that this party wants the government to reduce its intervention in the economy. In other words, the position of a party on the economic dimension reveals a preference for a change of the status quo towards more state intervention or more market within the boundaries of a social-democratic or liberal welfare regime (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Goodin *et al.*, 1999).

Q10

Q11



Table 2 Scores on the economic items

	<i>Total score</i>
Christian parties	+ 5
CDA	
SGP	0
CU	0
Socialist parties	-2
PvdA	
SP	-7
GreenLeft	-5
Liberal parties	+ 2
D66	
VVD	+ 10
VVD (draft)	+ 10
'New politics' party LPF	+ 4

We have selected 10 economic issues like privatization, reduction of the tax burden, health care, deregulation and some specific tax proposals. For each of the 10 items, we have established whether a party is in favour of or against a change of the *status quo* towards a more market-oriented economic policy. Table 2 shows the scores of the parties that have been elected in the Dutch parliament in 2003. The scores of the three Christian parties (CDA, CU and SGP), the three socialist parties (PvdA, GL and SP) and the two liberal parties (D66 and VVD) are consistent with the *Dutch triangle model* of 1998.

Only the socialist parties have a minus score on the economic dimension. The election programme of the VVD shows that this party wants to reform the economy in the direction of a freer market. If the VVD could implement its economic programme fully, the consequence would be that the social democratic welfare regime changes into a liberal welfare regime (Goodin *et al.*, 1999).

The election programmes of the socialist and the Christian parties show that these parties want to preserve the Dutch welfare regime, but differ on the question of how to preserve this social-economic regime. The two small socialist parties (SP and GL) are in favour of changing economic policy in the direction of more government involvement in the economy, that is, to strengthen the welfare regime. The labour party, the PvdA, has a more moderate position. The leading Christian party, the CDA, is more market orientated than the other two Christian parties (CU and SGP). It is interesting to see that the overall position of the CDA on the economic dimension is more 'pro market' than the LPF. The party of Fortuyn is in favour of changing the health-care system towards a market orientation. Also, the LPF is in favour of




Figure 5 The two-dimensional model of 2002–2003.

deregulation, reducing the tax burden, and solving the financial deficit. However, the LPF is also in favour of a redistribution of incomes and against privatization of public goods and services. The position of the LPF on the economic dimension is closer to the social-liberal party D66, than to the VVD.

2002 Space of Competition

Having determined the scores of the political parties on the two separate dimensions, we can now place these parties in a model (see Figure 5). We have placed the economic dimension on the horizontal axis, the *x*-axis. The multicultural dimension has been placed on the vertical axis, the *y*-axis. The clear distinction between the party families that could be seen in Figure 4, has



been more or less dissolved. Instead we now see a big cluster of parties in the top-centre and the top-right of the figure.

The positions of the parties in Figure 5 are a proximation of their position. If we had used some other issues, the positions of parties would have changed somewhat, but this change would be small. Almost all parties are positioned as being either moderately or outspokenly in favour of the unicultural society. The only exceptions to this are GreenLeft and D66, who both still support the multicultural society. GreenLeft combines this with supporting state intervention, whereas D66 supports the idea of a free market. This makes D66 the only true liberal party in the Dutch parliament, as it wants to increase the role of the market and it is impartial between different conceptions of ‘the good’ (Rawls, 1999). The other party that is regularly labelled as liberal, the VVD, has left the liberal conception of moral neutrality of the definition of the good society. The VVD has made a shift from a liberal ideology (draft programme) towards moral utilitarianism. This shift is illustrated by the vertical arrow in Figure 5.

In the political reality of an electoral campaign, the difference between the ideology of moral utilitarianism and conservatism is hard to distinguish, but there is a crucial distinction between the two. The primacy of moral utilitarianism lies in the economic performance, and the conception of a good society is instrumental. For conservatism it is the other way around, the economic policy is instrumental for the preservation of the good society. The combination of being a moderate adherent of the free market and a strong adherent of uniculturalism, defines a party as a conservative party.

The small orthodox protestant parties CU and SGP are conservative parties. They are in favour of uniculturalism and are more or less neutral about economic policy, because their plus and minus scores on ten issues are taken together and lead to a zero score. Also the LPF is a conservative party. It is moderately in favour of the market economy and it has the harshest position of the multicultural society. On economic policy, the LPF is more in line with the CDA than with the VVD. And, on the politics of multiculturalism, the LPF is closer to the VVD than to the CDA. The CDA has the same position as PvdA and CU in the cultural dimension, but is more in favour of market influences in the economy. There is no difference between the draft programme and the final version of the CDA with respect to the politics of multiculturalism.

There is a difference between the draft programme of the PvdA and the final version. The draft programme of the PvdA got the score ‘+2’ on the multicultural dimension. This means that not only the VVD moved towards the position of the LPF, but the PvdA also moved somewhat to Fortuyn’s position. The SP is clearly socialist when it comes to economic policy and combines this with a more or less neutral position in the cultural dimension.



From a Depoliticized Democracy Towards a Centrifugal Democracy?

In the election of 2002 there were two main topics on the political agenda: the economic policy of the neo-liberal purple coalition and the multicultural society, which includes the view on immigrants. We have constructed a space of competition which makes it possible to analyse the position of political parties towards these topics. The shift of the VVD on the multicultural dimension suggests that the VVD was concerned that it would lose a large part of its more conservative grass roots to the new party of Fortuyn. The problem for the VVD was, however, that Dijkstal was not willing to accept this change from a liberal position to a more conservative one. As party leader of the VVD, he refused to propagate the new view of his own party during the election of 2002. The conservative position of the VVD was much more clearly presented in the campaign of the election of 2003 by the new party leader Zalm. This strategy aimed to bring back the conservative voters who were attracted by the new politics of the LPF. Although Zalm was willing to change the official party tune in the campaign, he was also held responsible for pulling the plug of the coalition with the LPF.

Both aspects — the tension between the ‘official’ position of the VVD and the unwillingness of Dijkstal to defend the conservative position in 2002 and the resentment of the adherents of the new politics against Zalm because he was held responsible for the fall of the cabinet of Balkenende in 2003 — cannot be part of any model of some space of competition. One cannot deduce these elements by looking at the position of the parties in Figure 5. This means that many elements that are politically relevant are not part of the model, and this is a clear limitation. On the other hand, only by estimating the position of parties in a space of competition does one have a frame of reference to understand the mechanism of political competition among parties in a specific election.

Accepting the limitations of any modelling of the ideological position of political actors, the question arises as to which model one should use. If one models the election of 2002 with a single dimension, this model cannot explain the difference between the criticism against the neo-liberal economic policy of the purple coalition on the one hand and the criticism against the politics of multiculturalism on the other hand.

There is another argument against the left–right orientation as the relevant dimension in the space of competition. If the left–right dimension would explain the electoral succes of the LPF of 26 seats in the Dutch parliamentary election of 2002, this must be substantiated by a shift in the left–right orientation of the voters. However, the study of Van Holsteyn, Irwin and Den Ridder in this issue shows no such major shift in the left–right orientation of the electorate. Their study also shows that three dimensions play a role in the



Q4

perceptions of the voters: the components or dimensions are related to economic, multicultural and ethical issues. For the voters, especially the voters with a preference for the CDA, the ethical issue of euthanasia is still important. However, in contrast to the other two Christian parties, the CU and SGP, in the election programme of the CDA does not propose to reverse the ethical policy. Although the 'ideal position' of the CDA is probably in line with the orthodox protestant parties, the party elite of the CDA realizes that reversing the ethical policy of the purple coalition is not an option, because this position would make their membership of a future coalition very difficult. The electoral study of Van Holsteyn, Irwin and Den Ridder and our study on election programmes both lead to the conclusion that several dimensions are necessary for the construction of the space of competition in the election of 2002.

We have used only two dimensions, the economic and the multicultural dimensions, in our model of 2002 for analysing the position of political parties. The choice for using two dimensions, instead of three, is based on the notion that during the election campaign of 2002, only the economic and the multicultural issues were salient.

Figure 5 helps to interpret the ideological position of the parties. The CDA and the PvdA cannot 'move' towards the LPF without changing their 'rainbow scenario', in which allochthonous communities can preserve their cultural identity within their own 'pillar'. The small Christian parties, the CU and SGP, can 'move' towards a more unicultural position, but this would imply that the Christian values are no longer in conjunction with other religious values, such as the Islamic values. The most important question is: what will the ideological profile of the VVD be in the near future. If the VVD is going to establish itself as a party that subscribes to a viewpoint of the dominant values of the Christian–Judaic–Humanist culture, Dutch politics will have a new antithesis. The classical 'antithesis' between the religious and the secular parties will change into a new antithesis between Christian cultural values on the one hand and the Islamic cultural values on the other. This antithesis will polarize Dutch politics and it will lead to a new platform for a 'Islamic Party'. If that is going to happen, the multicultural society will be the dominant cleavage in Dutch politics, and without crosscutting cleavages the Netherlands shall be characterized as a *centrifugal democracy* (Lijphart, 1977, 106).

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Notes

1 The study on 'parties in space' is still work in progress.

Q14

2 See Irwin and Van Holsteyn (1999).

3 Most parties did not create wholly new election programmes for the election of January 2003, but simply reused their old programmes of May 2002. Some of these parties (CDA, VVD, PvdA, D66, ChristenUnie and GreenLeft) came up with minor additions to their 2002 programmes. Others (SGP, SP) copied (large parts of) their 2002 programmes. Of the parties that are represented in government, only the LPF and LN created a wholly new document. The election programmes of 2002 and 2003 of all political parties participating in these parliamentary elections have been collected in *Verkiezingen 2002 & 2003* (Verkiezingsprogramma's 2002 and 2003).

Q13

As the differences between the 2002 and 2003 programmes are only minor for most parties, the 2002 and 2003 spatial models would resemble each other very much. The position of the political parties has been taken as one position.

4 It is interesting to notice that there is a difference between the scholars who use the left–right orientation in electoral studies and those who use this dimension for the placing of parties with MRG coding. Van der Brug uses the left–right orientation for analysing the preferences of voters. He states that 'the meaning of left and right is dependent upon the current social, political and historical context' and the meaning of left and right issues is different in each country and in each election (Van der Brug, 2001, 130). Budge, on the other hand, uses the left–right orientation, based on the uniform MRG coding framework, to estimate the policy positions of parties across time and across nations (Budge, 2001; Budge *et al.*, 2001). This means that scholars using the same concept of the left–right orientation not only use different methods to measure the left–right orientation, but also have different views what this yardstick measures.

5 After the configuration of a local space of competition in several democracies, we can try to answer questions like: Does the presence of a large Christian party have an effect on the ideological positions of political actors? Or, does the proportional representation have effect on the space of competition between parties? In short, the consequence of our approach is that the research on the position of political actors must not start from the assumption of a common space of competition, but must begin with the modelling of separate local spaces for each election in each democracy. After that the question is: how can we compare the results of each local space in terms of a comparative analysis across time and across nations?

6 See for more aspects of the purple coalition on ethical issues: Trappenburg (2001).

7 The party manifestos were used as a source for this research, because they contain the official party positions and are updated or changed for every election. They thus provide an accurate indication of the evolution of party positions.

8 The reliability test, Cronbach alpha, is used to determine whether the selected issues formed a strong scale. The principal component analysis also proved that the selected issues were statistically representative for the three dimensions. The three dimensions could be clearly distinguished from one another. Conformatory factor analysis shows that the selected issues were less representative for one single component, the left–right dimension, but that the issues can be separated into three components, the three separate dimensions (Pelikaan, 2002).

9 This type of model was chosen because the existing statistical procedures to place parties in a multidimensional space misrepresented the party positions as a result of the small data set that was used. With only a small number of political parties and many political issues, programs like ALSICAL and PRINCALS misplaced parties (especially D66) because of their unique combination of positions on the three dimensions. Although the misplacements might appear



to be minor compared to the advantages that the statistical programs offer, the implications of those misplacements for further research can be significant. Research conducted on the basis of this data set proved that minor differences in the placement of the political parties by ALSICAL and PRINCALS resulted in different coalition predictions when they are used in coalition formation theories (Elkink and De Lange, 2002).

10 The orthodox protestant parties RPF and the GPV are united in a new party, the CU.

11 See page 18 of the draft manifesto of the VVD.

12 The notion of 'small margins of Dutch politics' originates from the former Dutch prime minister Den Uyl.

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